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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
BONNIE AKERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PENNY PRITZKER 
Secretary of Commerce, and 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
Defendant. 
Saris, U.S.D.J. 
) Civil Action No. 12-10240-PBS 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
November 4, 2013 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Bonnie Akerson brings this action alleging that 
her former employer, the United States Census Bureau, terminated 
her employment because she is Caucasian and disabled, in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C 
§ 2000, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701. She 
contends that she was terminated in retaliation for requesting 
reasonable accommodations for her disability, and that she was 
paid less than a similarly qualified male employee in violation 
of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Defendant moves for 
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summary judgment on all claims. The Court heard oral argument on 
the motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2013. After a review 
of the record, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination and 
retaliation but otherwise ALLOWS the motion. (Docket 23). 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
When all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff's 
favor, the record contains the following facts, which are 
undisputed except where noted. 
1. Employment at the Census Bureau 
In February 2008, the Bureau of the Census posted a 
recruiting bulletin for Partnership Specialist openings in the 
Boston regional office. Partnership Specialists were eligible for 
pay at four salary grade levels, GS-7, GS-9, GS-11, and GS-12. 
Applicants could apply to the position at one or more of the four 
grade levels, depending on their education and experience. The 
bulletin stated that applicants “[m]ust submit a separate 
completed Application for each grade level applied.” Under “HOW 
TO APPLY,” the posting provided the following instructions: 
Each applicant must submit a complete application for each 
grade level they wish to apply for, using the Optional 
Application for Federal Employment (OF-612), or a resume, 
listing your work duties and accomplishments relating to the 
job for which you are applying. If only one application is 
received, you will be considered only for the lowest grade. 
(emphasis in original). 
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Plaintiff, a Caucasian female, applied only for the Partnership 
Specialist position at the GS-9 pay grade. She did not apply for 
the other three grade levels. 
Partnership Specialists were responsible for educating 
external organizations about the upcoming 2010 Census and 
encouraging them to enter into “partnership agreements” with the 
Census Bureau. By signing a partnership agreement, an 
organization agreed to dedicate its time and resources to 
promoting the 2010 Census. The 2010 Census Partnership Agreement 
Form lists twenty-six ways in which a “partner” can support the 
Bureau’s efforts. Each partner could commit to one or more of 
these projects (referred to as “commitments”) by checking the 
appropriate boxes on the agreement form. Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. 
B (Docket 26). 
Plaintiff began working as a Partnership Specialist (GS-9) 
on May 12, 2008. Defendant paid Plaintiff at the GS-9 salary 
level. Carlos Linera, Plaintiff’s male colleague, applied for the 
Partnership Specialist position at the GS-11 pay grade, and he 
was paid at the higher level. The Partnership Specialist 
positions at the GS-9 and GS-11 levels involved substantially the 
same responsibilities. At the time of Plaintiff’s employment, at 
least one female Partnership Specialist was paid at the GS-11 
salary level. EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 311 (Kalaitzidis Test.) (Docket 
42, Ex. A ) . 
3 
Plaintiff had two supervisors at different points during her 
employment: Cesar Monzon, a Hispanic male, and Ana Maria Garcia, 
a Hispanic female. Monzon interviewed, hired and then supervised 
Plaintiff from her initial hiring date until December 23, 2008, 
when Garcia became her new supervisor. At all times during 
Plaintiff’s employment, Kathleen Ludgate, a Caucasian female, was 
the Director of the Boston Regional Census Office. 
2. Bladder Disease 
Plaintiff has suffered from an inflammatory bladder disease 
known as interstitial cystitis for approximately five years. The 
condition is exacerbated by stress, causing “flare-ups” during 
which her symptoms are more severe. When her condition is 
exacerbated, Plaintiff must use the restroom frequently, as often 
as every twenty minutes, although each visit typically lasts no 
longer than the restroom visits of a healthy individual. During 
flare-ups, she experiences a feeling of persistent “fullness” in 
her bladder, constant pressure and pain, and difficulty sleeping. 
Neither Monzon nor Ludgate was ever aware of Plaintiff’s illness. 
However, Garcia became aware of Plaintiff’s bladder condition and 
need for frequent restroom breaks on February 9, 2009. 
The following facts are largely disputed. Plaintiff asserts 
that Monzon would intentionally call her on the phone when she 
was in the restroom, although he could see her desk from his 
workspace. When she did not answer her phone, Monzon would send a 
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co-worker into the bathroom after Plaintiff, and then “shake his 
head disapprovingly” when Plaintiff returned from the bathroom. 
Monzon denies that he asked employees to seek out Plaintiff 
in the bathroom. He admits that he repeatedly inquired about 
Plaintiff’s whereabouts, but claims that he did so because on 
several occasions she was away from her desk for extended periods 
of time without explanation. Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. D (Docket 
26). Monzon did not recommend her for disciplinary action based 
on unexplained absences. Plaintiff’s October 2008 performance 
evaluation does not reference absences from the office. 
3. Work Performance 
In October of 2008, Plaintiff received a performance 
evaluation conducted by Monzon. On a scale of one (unacceptable 
performance) to five (highest level of performance), Plaintiff 
received a rating of “three” (acceptable performance) in all four 
evaluated categories. However, she received criticisms in two 
areas. Monzon’s review stated that Plaintiff needed to execute 
more timely follow-up with external partners and establish a time 
line for one of her projects. 
On or about November 3, 2008, Plaintiff’s office instituted 
a policy that all Partnership Specialists were to submit a 
minimum of ten signed partnership agreements per week. Laura 
Medrano, a Hispanic Partnership Specialist, testified as to her 
understanding that she could meet the quota by obtaining ten 
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total commitments (for example, by submitting two partnership 
agreement forms, each with five commitments checked off on the 
form). EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 303-4 (Medrano Test.) (Docket 34, Ex. 1 ) . 
Monzon testified that the requirement was ten agreements per 
week, as communicated to Specialists at two November meetings. 
EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 236-38 (Monzon Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. A ) . 
During the next three months, Plaintiff was counseled by her 
supervisors at least six times regarding her failure to meet the 
partnership agreement quota. On November 26, 2008, Monzon spoke 
with Plaintiff about her low numbers. He also expressed concern 
that she had not yet submitted a partnership agreement resulting 
from a business trip to Burlington, Vermont. Plaintiff entered 
the agreement from her Vermont trip into the database 
approximately one month after this conversation. 
On December 5, 2008, Monzon met with Plaintiff to discuss 
her failure to obtain ten signed agreements per week. In an e-
mail dated December 18, 2008, Monzon wrote, “your number[s] have 
to increase.” Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. J (Docket 26). On January 
5, 2009, Plaintiff was counseled about problems meeting her quota 
on a telephone call with Monzon and Garcia and in an email from 
Garcia the following day. 
In late January of 2009, Plaintiff twice met with Garcia 
regarding her work performance and partnership agreements. 
Plaintiff described the meetings as “heated” and “serious” and 
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believed her job might be in jeopardy. EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 101 (Pl. 
Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. A ) . During one of these meetings, Garcia 
stated that Plaintiff was on probation. At the last of these 
meetings, on January 23, 2009, Garcia discussed with Plaintiff 
the fact that she had submitted only seven partnership agreements 
for the week, none of which contained original signatures and two 
of which were dated from October of the previous year. 
In addition to the ongoing criticism of Plaintiff’s 
performance with respect to partnership agreements, five other 
incidents bear on Plaintiff’s work performance and interactions 
with colleagues. On December 29-30, 2009, Plaintiff and Monzon 
exchanged a series of emails regarding “Hudson College,” only 
later discovering each was referring to a different “Hudson 
College.” Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. L (Docket 26). Plaintiff felt 
that Monzon’s emailed reply constituted an unfair criticism. On 
January 5, 2009, Plaintiff sent an email listing one of her 
upcoming meetings as “Tufts Dental,” but was not explicit with 
her supervisors that it was a personal medical appointment and 
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not a business meeting, which caused confusion.1 Def. Mem. in 
Supp., Ex. M (Docket 26). 
Conflict arose between Plaintiff and Ludgate, who is also 
Caucasian. At one point, Plaintiff claims that Ludgate yelled at 
her and criticized her for being late to leave for a trip to 
Rhode Island with another Partnership Specialist, who is African-
American. Plaintiff avers that Ludgate did not similarly 
reprimand the other Partnership Specialist, who was equally 
responsible for the miscommunication. Ludgate denies that she 
yelled at Plaintiff and claims that she also spoke to the other 
Partnership Specialist about time management concerns. Def. Mem. 
in Supp., Ex. I (Docket 26). 
On January 14, 2009, Ludgate criticized Plaintiff’s 
preparation for a meeting with the Boston Chamber of Commerce 
that day. Ludgate expressed irritation that Plaintiff had not 
printed directions to the meeting location before they left the 
1
 The email lists two “Meetings this week,” one with the United 
Auto Workers and one with Tufts Dental. Before leaving for a 
personal dental appointment on January 6, 2009, Plaintiff left a 
medical leave slip on Monzon’s chair. At this point, Garcia 
supervised Plaintiff, not Monzon. Defendant's Sick Leave Policy 
states that employees with scheduled medical appointments must 
“notify your supervisor as far in advance as possible” and 
prepare a Request for Leave or Approved Absence form for 
supervisor approval. Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. N (Docket 26). 
Plaintiff did not submit documentation of her appointment in 
advance. On January 6, 2009, Garcia emailed Plaintiff, stating 
that she was “confused” by Plaintiff’s January 5, 2009 email 
about the two scheduled meetings. Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. M 
(Docket 26). 
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Census office. When Plaintiff and Ludgate arrived at the Boston 
Chamber of Commerce, Chamber representatives said that they were 
unprepared for the meeting because they did not have it on the 
schedule. Plaintiff had booked the meeting months before but had 
not confirmed it. Ludgate reported this incident to both Garcia 
and Monzon. 
Finally, on January 20, 2009, Plaintiff sent an email to 
Garcia and Monzon inquiring about the tax implications of college 
student residency. Monzon referred Plaintiff to a manual 
regarding residence rules. He and Garcia later criticized 
Plaintiff because they believed she ought to have known the 
answer. 
4. Leave of Absence and Termination 
In late January of 2009, Plaintiff’s bladder condition 
worsened. On January 26, 2009, she began an unexpected two-week 
leave of absence recommended by her urologist. Upon returning to 
work on February 9, 2009, Plaintiff met with Garcia and a Human 
Resources representative. Plaintiff’s purpose in requesting the 
meeting was to discuss her medical leave and inform her 
supervisor of her bladder condition. She submitted two notes from 
her doctor indicating she could return to work “without 
restriction.” Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. P (Docket 26). During the 
meeting, Garcia asked Plaintiff how long she would need to be in 
the bathroom on any given visit, which Plaintiff found 
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humiliating. Garcia also asked Plaintiff to let her know about 
her whereabouts whenever she was away from her desk for reasons 
other than using the restroom. Plaintiff alleges that other 
employees were not similarly required to inform Garcia about 
their whereabouts when away from their desks. 
Furthermore, upon her return, Plaintiff found her desk had 
been moved to a different location, and her duties had been 
reassigned. She was instructed to train co-workers on a software 
program, rather than continue working on the Colleges and 
Universities Initiative as she had prior to her leave. On 
February 12, 2009, Defendant sent a termination letter to 
Plaintiff. Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. E (Docket 26). 
Defendant asserts that the decision to terminate Plaintiff 
came in January of 2009, before her medical leave of absence 
began on January 26. Monzon testified that he recommended 
Plaintiff’s termination around January 13. EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 254, 
281-82 (Monzon Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. A ) . Garcia testified that 
she recommended Plaintiff’s termination to her supervisor around 
January 23, with a tentative termination date of January 30. EEOC 
Hr’g Tr. at 350 (Garcia Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. A ) . Defendant did 
not provide documentation to support this testimony about the 
timing of the decision. Although Garcia and Monzon both testify 
that their recommendations went to the Boston Regional Office’s 
coordinator of administration, it is not clear who from 
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“headquarters” ultimately approved Plaintiff’s termination. Id. 
at 349-50; EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 254 (Monzon Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. 
A ) . Monzon signed the termination letter. 
During Garcia’s tenure at the Census Bureau, she supervised 
two other Partnership Specialists who were terminated, a 
Caucasian male for insubordination and an African-American female 
for performance issues. Id. at 350-51. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To succeed 
on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate that there is an “absence of evidence supporting the 
non-moving party’s case.” Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 
660 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 325 (1986)). 
The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact for trial. Quinones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 289 (1st 
Cir. 2006). A genuine issue exists where the evidence is 
“sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to 
resolve the issue in favor of either side.” Nat’l Amusements, 
Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. 
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denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995). A material fact is “one that has 
the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Calero-
Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). 
“If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly 
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations 
omitted). In its review of this evidence, the Court must examine 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party – 
here, Plaintiff – and draw all reasonable inferences in her 
favor. Sands, 212 F.3d at 661. “In the final analysis, . . . [the 
Court] is required to determine if ‘there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for 
that party.’” Id. (citing Anderson, 447 U.S. at 249). 
B. Race Discrimination 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis 
of race. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff alleges that the 
Defendant violated Title VII by subjecting her to disparate 
treatment because she is Caucasian. The Court analyzes this claim 
under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 
Bhatti v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 
2011) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973)). First, a plaintiff must mount a prima facie claim of 
race discrimination. Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70. The burden shifts to 
the employer to rebut the plaintiff’s claim by offering a 
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legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its employment decision. 
Id. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that the 
reasons offered are mere pretext, and the real basis for the 
adverse action was her race. Id. 
1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination 
based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that (1) she 
belongs to a protected class; (2) her job performance met her 
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (4) there is some evidence of a causal 
connection between her membership in a protected class and the 
adverse employment action. Cham v. Station Operators, Inc., 685 
F.3d 87, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2012); Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 70. Plaintiff 
is Caucasian. The Supreme Court has held that because the 
language of Title VII is “not limited to discrimination against 
members of any particular race”, the statute prohibits racial 
discrimination against Caucasian employees “upon the same 
standards as would be applicable” to non-white employees. 
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976).2 
2
 Effectively, the McDonald Court concluded that all individuals 
are members of a protected class for purposes of Title VII racial 
discrimination cases, making the first prong of the prima facie 
case a nullity. The Seventh Circuit has dropped this prong in 
cases with white petitioners, replacing it with a stricter 
requirement that the plaintiff show “background circumstances 
that demonstrate that a particular employer has reason or 
inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites or 
evidence that there is something fishy about the facts at hand.” 
Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal 
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Plaintiff’s supervisors gave her a rating of “three" in all 
categories of her October 2008 evaluation, indicating a 
satisfactory level of performance. Cf. Douglas v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 260, 273 (D. Mass. 2006), aff’d, 474 F.3d 10 
(1st Cir. 2007) (although the plaintiff’s performance reviews 
“were not without criticism, for the most part they describe a 
level of job performance that is, at a minimum, satisfactory”). 
With the first two prongs met, the Court turns to the third. 
An employment action is adverse if it materially alters the 
conditions of the workplace and terms of the employment. Cham, 
685 F.3d at 94. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered five adverse 
actions on account of her race: (1) Monzon’s behavior towards her 
when she used the restroom; (2) the exchange between Monzon, 
Garcia, and Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s January 20, 2009 
email inquiring about census rules regarding college student 
residency; (3) Ludgate’s response to the miscommunication between 
Plaintiff and her co-worker regarding meeting time and location 
for their Rhode Island trip; (4) Ludgate’s criticism of 
Plaintiff’s preparation for the Boston Chamber of Commerce 
meeting; and (5) Plaintiff’s termination. 
When the challenged actions are examined from the objective 
perspective of a reasonable employee, each of the first four 
quotations omitted). The First Circuit has thus far retained the 
traditional prima facie framework. 
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incidents does not rise to the level of an adverse action. See 
Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 54 (1st Cir. 2008). To 
be adverse, an employment action must be more than an 
objectionable exchange, however much an incident might displease 
the employee or cause legitimate hurt feelings. Morales-
Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011). An adverse action “typically 
involves discrete changes in the terms of employment, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing 
significant change in benefits.” Id. (internal quotation 
omitted). 
Beginning with the first challenged action, Mr. Monzon’s 
alleged conduct did not materially alter the terms of her 
employment. The second incident surrounding Plaintiff’s email 
inquiry, as viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable employee, 
did not rise to the level of an adverse action. Monzon’s response 
email offered a straightforward answer to Plaintiff’s question, 
and the subsequent critique from Monzon and Garcia was not 
disciplinary in nature. Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 73 (criticisms 
“merely directed at correcting” work performance do not rise to 
the level of adverse actions). As for the third and fourth 
alleged adverse actions, verbal criticism, even if spoken in a 
tone that pushes the bounds of professionalism, does not 
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constitute an adverse action when unaccompanied by any tangible 
consequence. Id.; see also Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del 
Caribe, Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 2003) (observing that “a 
supervisor’s unprofessional managerial approach and accompanying 
efforts to assert her authority are not the focus of the 
discrimination laws”). 
Plaintiff’s termination qualifies as a textbook adverse 
action, so the Court turns to the fourth step in the prima facie 
analysis. Plaintiff does not explicitly describe how her 
termination was causally connected to her race. Though she 
asserts generally that she was treated more harshly than non-
Caucasian employees when she was terminated, she does not point 
to evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to infer that her 
termination had anything to do with being Caucasian. While the 
timing of the termination may have been fishy (more on that 
later), there is nothing about the termination which suggests 
race (as opposed to a disability-related matter). The only 
instance in which she asserts she was treated more harshly 
involved a situation where she felt she was unfairly criticized 
for being late to a meeting, but an equally responsible African-
American colleague was not similarly criticized. Although a 
plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate a prima facie case “is not an 
onerous one,” Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st 
Cir. 2003), vague assertions coupled with her account of this one 
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incident, which is not even mentioned in the termination letter, 
are not sufficient. 
2. Agency’s Proferred Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason 
for Dismissal and Pretext for Discrimination 
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination, her claim fails under the 
second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
regime. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant has articulated 
a lawful, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination: 
her poor performance, as described in her termination letter. See 
Def. Mem. in Supp., Ex. E (Docket 26). 
At the third step of the analysis, the burden shifts back to 
Plaintiff to show that the Agency’s proffered reason is “a 
coverup” for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. 
Pretext can be shown through evidence highlighting “weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions” in the employer’s reasons. Santiago-Ramos v. 
Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000). 
Plaintiff argues that her termination letter contains five 
deficiencies, and thus the real reason for her termination was 
her race. Because her assertions also bear on the disability 
discrimination analysis below, the Court comprehensively 
addresses each alleged deficiency here. 
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Plaintiff argues that the letter erroneously declares that 
she failed to improve on issues identified in her October 2008 
performance review. The termination letter discusses the two 
areas of concern identified at this performance review: customer 
service and plan implementation. While the letter does not state 
that termination was about a failure to improve, it does focus on 
multiple performance deficiencies. 
Plaintiff argues that the termination letter falsely states 
that she did not submit a partnership agreement form from her 
trip to Burlington, Vermont. Defendant agrees that the letter is 
incorrect, and Plaintiff did submitted a signed form from this 
trip. It is undisputed, though, that the completed form was not 
submitted until a month after Monzon reminded Plaintiff to submit 
it. Plaintiff does not dispute that Monzon also counseled her 
about “ineffective planning” for her trip. 
Next, Plaintiff argues that the letter erroneously alleges 
that she misrepresented a personal appointment at Tufts Dental as 
a business meeting. The letter itself does not claim that 
Plaintiff intended to mislead her supervisors. Instead, it 
describes how Plaintiff’s January 5, 2009 email confused her 
supervisors, and led Garcia to “inform[] [her] of the seriousness 
of providing erroneous information regarding business related 
meetings” during their January 7, 2009 meeting. While Plaintiff 
may have felt that Garcia overreacted to a miscommunication, the 
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email was confusing. Few of us would list a doctor's appointment 
as a "meeting this week." 
Most significantly, Plaintiff objects to the termination 
letter’s description of Plaintiff’s supposed inability to meet 
her partnership agreement quota. During the fall of 2008, 
Defendant adopted the policy requiring each Partnership 
Specialist to complete a minimum of ten agreements each week. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that this expectation was communicated 
to all Partnership Specialists in the Boston office in early 
November 2008. Plaintiff points to evidence that Laura Medrano, a 
Hispanic Partnership Specialist, understood the policy as a 
requirement to obtain ten total commitments from partners, but 
Plaintiff does not offer evidence that Medrano’s interpretation 
represented office policy. Indeed, Plaintiff herself testified 
that “everybody had to meet the quota.” EEOC Hr’g Tr. at 106 (Pl. 
Test.) (Docket 26, Ex. A ) . It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed 
to meet this quota. She was counseled about this deficiency on at 
least six occasions between November 2008 and January 2009, and 
she repeatedly submitted partnership agreements with errors, such 
as missing original signatures and altered Partner commitments. 
None of Plaintiff’s assertions, even taken together, amount 
to a showing that the “true reason” for her termination is racial 
discrimination. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 54. While the 
termination letter contains one inaccuracy, the record at summary 
19 
judgment supports the general thrust of the letter’s stated 
reasons for her termination. Plaintiff offers little to no 
evidence that the termination itself was the result of racial 
bias. See Bhatti, 659 F.3d at 72. Plaintiff does not dispute that 
the only other Partnership Specialist supervised by Garcia who 
was terminated for poor performance was African-American. While 
not determinative, this negates Plaintiff’s contention that she 
was treated differently than similarly-situated non-Caucasian 
employees when she was terminated on account of her job 
performance. 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
ALLOWED with respect to Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim. 
C. Disability Discrimination 
The Rehabilitation Act, which applies to federal agencies, 
prohibits employment discrimination against a disabled person on 
the basis of her disability.3 29 U.S.C. § 794. For purposes of 
summary judgment, the Court reviews Plaintiff’s claim under the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework described above. 
Rios-Jimenez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2008). 
3
 Cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) and jurisprudence regarding that statute are also 
instructive for this Court’s analysis, as liability standards are 
the same under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 791(g); see also Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 2006); Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 
19 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he caselaw construing the ADA generally 
pertains equally to claims under the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
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1. Prima Facie Case 
To put forth a prima facie showing of disability 
discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was 
disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) she 
was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, 
either with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the 
defendant took adverse action against her because of her 
disability. Id. at 41 (citing Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002)). Defendant disputes that 
Plaintiff is disabled as that term is defined by the 
Rehabilitation Act, and if she is, that she was terminated 
because of her disability. 
Disability under the Rehabilitation Act may be established 
under the “actual disability prong” through a showing of a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or 
more major life activities. 28 U.S.C. § 12102(1); Carreras v. 
Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010). Under 
this definition, the Court examines (1) whether the plaintiff 
suffers from a mental or physical impairment; (2) whether the 
impairment limits a life activity that qualifies as major; and 
(3) whether the impairment substantially limits the major life 
activity. Carreras, 596 F.3d at 32. “The burden is on the 
plaintiff to establish these three elements.” Id. 
21 
The 2008 ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), which contains a 
conformity provision for the Rehabilitation Act, provides 
guidance for courts assessing whether a plaintiff is disabled. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Under the amended ADA, “[t]he definition 
of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage 
of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the 
[Amendments].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Indeed, “the primary 
purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with 
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.1(c)(4). An impairment is a disability within the meaning of 
the Rehabilitation Act if it “substantially limits the ability of 
an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to 
most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). 
The ADAAA took effect January 1, 2009 – just over a month 
before Plaintiff was terminated from her position. The ADAAA does 
not apply retroactively to conduct occurring before the Act took 
effect. Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 34 
(1st Cir. 2009). Because the crux of Plaintiff’s disability 
discrimination claim concerns conduct occurring after January 1, 
2009 – including several meetings with her supervisors, her leave 
of absence, her request for accommodations, and her termination – 
the Court will evaluate her disability discrimination claims with 
respect to the new ADA standards. 
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With that background, the Court returns to the three-part 
Carreras test, bearing in mind that courts “must determine the 
existence of a disability ‘on a case-by-case basis.’” 596 F.3d at 
33 (citing Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 
(1999)). Plaintiff’s condition satisfies the first prong of 
Carreras. The amended ADA now includes as a physical impairment 
“any physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or 
more body systems, such as . . . [the] digestive [and] 
genitourinary [systems].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Because Plaintiff’s 
impairment affects her bladder, she has a physical impairment. 
Plaintiff satisfies the second Carreras prong because her alleged 
condition impairs her ability to work, a major life activity 
under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); Quiles-Quiles v. 
Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006). 
The third Carreras prong asks the Court to assess “the 
degree of limitation occasioned by [Plaintiff’s] physical 
impairment.” 596 F.3d at 33. Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s 
contention that her ability to work is substantially limited 
because she frequently must use the bathroom. Defendant also 
points out that the flare-ups of the condition are limited in 
duration, can be controlled by medication, and that Plaintiff's 
doctor allowed her to return to work "without restrictions." When 
her condition is exacerbated by stress, Plaintiff says she is 
required to use the restroom as often as every twenty minutes, 
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with each visit lasting between five and ten minutes. Because 
Plaintiff testifies she experiences such disruption throughout 
her workday, a reasonable jury could find that she is 
substantially limited in her ability to work “as compared to most 
people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1). The 
Court concludes that this “fact-intensive and individualized” 
inquiry is best left to a jury. Carreras, 596 F.3d at 33 
(internal quotation omitted). 
Having concluded that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court briefly 
describes the second and third prongs of Plaintiff’s prima facie 
case. As Defendant concedes, Plaintiff was qualified for her job. 
Her termination constitutes an adverse employment action.4 The 
four-day interval between Plaintiff’s disclosure of her 
disability and her termination “is sufficiently close temporal 
proximity to warrant a prima facie inference of a causal 
connection between the two.” Alvarado v. Donahoe, 687 F.3d 453, 
464 (1st Cir. 2012). 
4
 Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to other adverse 
employment actions because of her disability, including moving 
her desk after her leave of absence, taking her off the Colleges 
and Universities initiative, and reassigning her to train 
coworkers. As discussed supra, these events do not rise to the 
level of adverse employment actions under federal employment 
anti-discrimination law, either standing alone or considered 
cumulatively. Compare Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 
35-40 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011), with 
Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 97 
(1st Cir. 2006). 
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2. Agency’s Proferred Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason 
for Dismissal 
As stated above, Defendant asserts that they discontinued 
Plaintiff’s employment because of her poor performance, a lawful, 
non-discriminatory reason for termination. 
3. Pretext for Discrimination and Discriminatory Animus 
The Court turns to the question of discriminatory animus, 
asking whether a factfinder could “reasonably infer that unlawful 
discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse 
employment action.” Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador 
Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000). Plaintiff 
presents evidence that Monzon would ask coworkers to follow 
Plaintiff to the restroom and “shake his head disapprovingly” 
when she returned. Moreover, the temporal proximity between 
Plaintiff’s February meeting with Garcia and her termination is 
probative of discriminatory animus, especially in combination 
with other changes in her employment conditions. After she 
returned from medical leave and informed Garcia of her bladder 
disease, Plaintiff’s desk was moved and her duties were 
reassigned. Garcia asked Plaintiff to inform her whenever she 
would be away from her desk for reasons other than using the 
bathroom, though Plaintiff contends other employees were not 
required to tell their supervisors about their whereabouts. Four 
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days after informing Garcia of her bladder disease, Defendant 
terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 
While Defendant contends that the recommendation to 
terminate Plaintiff was made before she told them about her 
disability, the Agency provides no documentation of this 
decision, such as memoranda, emails or texts between the 
individuals involved in that decision. In this age of 
connectivity, this lack of contemporaneous documentation is 
unusual for such a serious matter. Moreover, the accounts of the 
supervisors differ. A reasonable jury could conclude that 
Plaintiff’s request for accommodation became the deciding factor 
in her termination decision. While there is undisputed evidence 
that Plaintiff had performance deficiencies, particularly with 
respect to meeting her quota, a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Defendant, upon learning of Plaintiff’s disability and/or 
request for bathroom accommodations, artificially inflated the 
severity of these deficiencies as pretext for firing her based on 
her disability. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s disability 
discrimination claim. 
D. Retaliation 
The Rehabilitation Act makes the ADA’s anti-retaliation 
provision available to Federal employees, making it illegal to 
“discriminate against any individual because such individual has 
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. . . exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected 
by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), (b); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). 
As with discrimination claims, retaliation claims follow the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Alvarado v. Donahoe, 
687 F.3d 453, 458 (1st Cir. 2012). 
To make out a prima facie retaliation claim, a plaintiff 
must show that “(1) [she] engaged in protected conduct, (2) [she] 
was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (3) 
there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and 
the adverse action.” Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 70 (1st 
Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has met her burden. A reasonable request 
for disability accommodation constitutes a protected activity for 
the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. See Kelley v. Corr. Med. 
Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013); Wright v. 
CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003). Plaintiff 
engaged in protected conduct when she met with Garcia in February 
2009 and informed Garcia about her bladder condition and need for 
frequent restroom breaks. Temporal proximity between a protected 
activity and an adverse employment action, especially when so 
close, can satisfy a plaintiff’s prima facie showing of 
causation. See Colon-Fontanez, 660 F.3d at 37; Calero-Cerezo, 355 
F.3d at 25-26 (finding plaintiff established prima facie element 
of causation where suspension came roughly one month after 
engagement in protected activity). Here, causation is evident from 
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the four-day proximity between Plaintiff’s request for 
accommodations and her termination. 
Because Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination, the Court asks 
whether a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s 
justification is a pretext for retaliation. A plaintiff may only 
obtain relief under the anti-retaliation provision of the 
Rehabilitation Act when retaliatory conduct is the but-for cause 
of an adverse employment action. Palmquist, 689 F.3d at 77. It is 
the plaintiff’s burden to “show that the proffered reason is 
pretextual and that the job action was the result of the 
defendant’s retaliatory animus.” Kelley, 707 F.3d at 115. As 
stated above, the timing of Plaintiff’s request for accommodation 
for the alleged disability and her termination is highly 
probative of retaliation, especially considered in combination 
with her supervisor’s alleged attitude toward her frequent 
bathroom breaks and changes in her employment conditions after 
her return from medical leave. Compare Carreras, 596 F.3d at 37-
38, with Wright, 352 F.3d at 478. A reasonable jury could 
determine that but for her request for accommodations, Plaintiff 
would not have been terminated, despite her track record of 
mediocre performance. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 
therefore DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 
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E. Equal Pay Act 
The Equal Pay Act prohibits wage discrimination “between 
employees on the basis of sex . . . for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Plaintiff argues that 
Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act by paying her less than 
Carlos Linera, a male Partnership Specialist. 
To prove a violation of the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must 
first make a prima facie showing “that the employer paid 
different wages to an employee of the opposite sex for 
substantially equal work.” Ingram v. Brink’s, Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 
232 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 217 
U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). The parties agree that Plaintiff has met 
her burden. Both Plaintiff and Linera applied for and were 
offered Partnership Specialist positions. Defendant paid 
Plaintiff at the GS-9 pay grade, but paid Linera at the GS-11 pay 
grade for substantially similar, if not identical, work. See 
Mullenix v. Forsyth Dental Infirmary for Children, 965 F. Supp. 
120, 139 (D. Mass. 1996) (plaintiff may make out a prima facie 
showing by comparing herself to one male comparator). 
The burden shifts to Defendant to establish that the wage 
discrepancy resulted from (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit 
system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or 
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quality of production; or (4) a differential based on any other 
factor other than sex. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). Defendant argues that the fourth 
affirmative defense applies to this case. 
“Acceptable factors ‘other than sex’ include experience, 
prior salary, education, skills which the employer deems useful 
to the position, and a proven ability to generate higher revenues 
for the employer’s business.” Scott v. Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc., 
141 F. Supp. 2d 154, 176 (D. Mass. 2001). Factors used to 
establish proper “other than sex” justifications are typically 
factual and verifiable, as opposed to subjective. See id. at 176-
77 (“superior sales, market conditions, or prior work experience” 
justify compensating similarly situated male employees more than 
female plaintiff); Girdis v. E.E.O.C., 688 F. Supp. 40, 46 (D. 
Mass. 1987), aff’d 851 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1988) (verifiable 
“employment programs and practices” establish wage differential 
other than sex). 
The undisputed facts establish that both Plaintiff and 
Linera served as Partnership Specialists. Applicants for the 
Partnership Specialist position could apply to one or more pay 
grades, based on his or her education and experience. Defendant 
posted the Partnership Specialist application with the 
instructions that applicants “must submit a complete application 
for each grade level they wish to apply for,” explicitly warning 
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that “[i]f only one application is received, you will considered 
only for the lowest grade.” (emphasis in original). 
Plaintiff applied for the Partnership Specialist position at 
the GS-9 pay grade only. She does not claim that she submitted 
additional applications for other grade levels. Accordingly, 
Defendant hired Plaintiff at the GS-9 pay grade. Linera applied 
to the same position at the GS-11 level, and Defendant hired him 
at that pay grade. Plaintiff’s qualifications may have justified 
a GS-11 salary, but Defendant’s job posting makes clear that if 
an individual submits only one completed application, that 
individual will be considered only for that one pay grade level. 
Plaintiff does not assert that she was denied an opportunity to 
apply to the Partnership Specialist position at a higher pay 
grade than the GS-9 level, or that she was advised to apply only 
to that job. Further, Defendant presents evidence showing that at 
least one female Partnership Specialist was hired at the GS-11 
pay grade. 
Defendant’s employment practice of hiring and compensating 
individuals based on the job grade he or she applies for 
constitutes a legitimate factor independent of sex. Cf. Girdis, 
688 F. Supp. at 46-48 (holding that “time in grade” compensation 
restriction against female plaintiffs constitutes factor other 
than sex; “if the plaintiffs had been males, they still would 
have been restricted to the [lower pay grade]”). Accordingly, 
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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED with respect 
to Plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim. 
IV. ORDER 
After a review of the record and hearing, the Court ALLOWS 
IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Docket No. 23) as follows: 
- Count I: Summary judgment DENIED. 
- Count II: Summary judgment ALLOWED. 
- Count III: Summary judgment ALLOWED. 
- Count IV: Summary judgment DENIED. 
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS 
Patti B. Saris 
Chief United States District Judge 
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